Chapter 574

Unraveling the Network of Interests Behind National Humiliation

Then, Zhu Dijun opened a document on his computer, which listed the behind-the-scenes beneficiaries of the Gengxu Incident in a table and posted it in the live broadcast room.

"Family members, let's look here."

The Salt Merchants of Jiangnan: The "Masterminds" of the Smuggling Empire (Supplementing evidence on fund flows, routes, and operations)

1. Wang Zonghui of Shexian County: A "Double Tycoon" Who Monopolized the Salt Industry and Engaged in Smuggling in Border Towns

Scale of Wealth and Political Infiltration: According to the "Records of Food and Commodities" in the "Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty," in the 29th year of the Jiajing reign, Wang Zonghui controlled 47% of the total salt quota in Lianghuai, with an annual profit of 1.8 million taels of silver (equivalent to 1.2 times the annual salt tax of the Ming Dynasty). He bribed Yan Song with 200,000 taels of "annual tribute silver" to obtain the nominal title of "Salt Transport Commissioner of Lianghuai," which allowed him to directly dispatch the transport ships of the Salt Transport Office. These ships ostensibly transported salt, but in reality, they disguised silk, porcelain, and bronzeware from Jiangnan as "salt package accessories," transporting them via the Grand Canal to Tongzhou, and then to the border towns of Xuanfu and Datong.

Secret Deal with Qiu Luan:

A private letter from the Wang family, discovered in the "Military Preparations Examination" section of the *Datong Town Gazetteer*, reveals that in May of the 29th year of the Jiajing reign (1550), Wang Zonghui dispatched his trusted confidant, Wang Wenyan, to Datong to deliver 300,000 taels of silver and 2000 bolts of high-quality Suzhou embroidery to Qiu Luan. The condition was that Qiu Luan "use the Mongol military might to force the court to increase its military pay and ensure the smooth operation of the smuggling route through Xuanfu and Datong." The letter explicitly states: "Anda's troops must avoid Yangzhou and Huai'an, and focus on attacking Jizhou. Upon success, a hundred firearms will be provided." This perfectly matches Anda's route during the Gengxu Incident, where he bypassed Datong and directly attacked Jizhou.

The closed-loop profit model of smuggling: Wang Zonghui's operation process is clearly traceable: ① Exchange salt certificates obtained through the exchange method for silver; ② Purchase handicrafts from Jiangnan with silver; ③ Transport the goods by canal boat to the border town, and then deliver them to Altan Khan through Qiu Luan; ④ Altan Khan repays the debt with plundered gold, silver, and furs, or directly resells the goods to Japan; ⑤ Japanese silver is transported back to Jiangnan by sea smuggling ships and then invested in the salt industry and handicrafts. The profit margin of a single route reached 600%. In the 29th year of the Jiajing reign alone, the Wang family profited 3.2 million taels of silver through smuggling.

2. Wu Jizuo from Xiuning: The "supply dispatcher" for border smuggling.

Through marriage alliances and collusion with border generals: Wu Jizuo's eldest daughter married the son of Zhao Qing, the general of Xuanfu, and his second daughter married the younger brother of Liu Han, the deputy general of Jizhou. Through these marriage alliances, he controlled the "military procurement rights" of Xuanfu and Jizhou.

According to the "Xuanfu Town Gazetteer - Examination of Military Funds", Wu Jizuo contracted Xuanfu Town in the 29th year of the Jiajing reign (1550).

The "Armament Upgrade" project was falsely reported at three times the cost. 1500 catties of brass and 800 catties of gunpowder were disguised as "armory raw materials" and transported to the Mongolian border through Zhao Qing's army, where they were resold to Altan Khan's caravan.

Maritime smuggling connections: Wu Jizuo had long been colluding with Xu Hai, a Ningbo merchant (who later became a leader of the Wokou pirates). He established the "Hengshun Trading Company" in Ningbo, specifically to receive Mongolian furs and looted goods resold by Altan Khan, which were then transported to Nagasaki, Japan, via Xu Hai's fleet. Xu Hai's confession, included in *Chouhai Tubian: A Study of Wokou*, mentions:

"In the 29th year of Jiajing's reign, Wu Jizuo entrusted me to resell Mongolian furs, which yielded 500,000 taels of silver. He gave me 100,000 taels to purchase Japanese swords and firearms." This laid the groundwork for the weapons later used in the Jiajing Japanese pirate raids.

3. Jingyang Wang Yu: A "Logistics Hub" for Cross-Regional Smuggling

The triangular passage between Shaanxi and Shanxi, Jiangnan, and the border towns: Wang Yu used his identity as a Shaanxi merchant to set up "grain depots" in Xi'an and Taiyuan, transporting Shaanxi's grain and ironware to Xuanfu, exchanging them for silk from Jiangnan merchants, and then reselling them to Anda.

According to the "Shaanxi General History: Trade and Commerce", in the 29th year of Jiajing (1550), Wang Yu dispatched 120 grain ships to transport grain to Xuanfu under the guise of "border army grain". 30% of the grain was directly resold, making a profit of 150,000 taels of silver. At the same time, 2000 Shaanxi cast iron swords and 500 suits of armor were handed over to Altan Khan through the generals of Xuanfu, in exchange for 300,000 taels of silver.

The transshipment of goods during the Gengxu Incident: After Anda Khan plundered the capital region, Wang Yu quickly mobilized 80 smuggling ships to transport the looted gold, silver, and silk from Tianjin Port to Yangzhou, and then distributed them to Suzhou and Hangzhou for sale. The "Yangzhou Prefecture Gazetteer - Examination of Disasters and Anomalies" records: "In the autumn of Gengxu, the number of merchant ships in Tianjin suddenly increased, carrying mostly gold and silver utensils, all of which were from the capital region. The person in charge was a Shaanxi merchant surnamed Wang"—this "Shaanxi merchant surnamed Wang" was Wang Yu. He made a net profit of 80 taels of silver through this transshipment, becoming a key bridge connecting the border town's plunder with the sale in Jiangnan.

II. Court Officials: "Protective Umbrellas" for Interest Groups (Supplementary Evidence of Collusion and Decision-Making Secrets)

1. Yan Song: A powerful "representative of interests" who held sway over the court.

The specific operations of protecting smuggling: According to Volume 364 of the "Veritable Records of Emperor Shizong of Ming," in July of the 29th year of the Jiajing reign, Censor Shen Shu impeached "salt merchants from Lianghuai smuggling to border towns, with border generals accepting bribes and condoning it." Yan Song suppressed the memorial and instead, on the grounds of "recklessly discussing border affairs," had Shen Shu flogged eighty times and exiled to Liaodong. At the same time, Yan Song altered the border town reports, changing "frequent smuggling" to "Mongol incursions leading to material losses," forcing the court to increase border pay.

The true intention behind "fortifying the walls and not fighting": During the Gengxu Incident, Yan Song's secret letter to Ding Rukui, the Minister of War, was included in "Yan Song's Collected Works: Memorials and Discussions." In the letter, he wrote: "Anda's troops are interested in gold and silk, not in attacking the city. Fortify the walls and do not fight. Let them leave on their own. Why increase casualties in vain?"

Seemingly a safe course of action, there was a real concern that the Ming army's involvement in the war would disrupt smuggling routes—at the time, the silk and firearms in Altan Khan's army all came from smuggling in Jiangnan, and if the war escalated, the grain transport ships and border town transit stations might be destroyed. Afterwards, to cover up the truth, Yan Song made Ding Rukui a scapegoat and beheaded him. The *History of Ming* clearly records in the biography of Ding Rukui: "Rukui, acting on Yan Song's instructions, closed his camp and refused to fight. When the emperor was angry, Yan Song blamed Rukui."

2. Qiu Luan: The "Executor of the Rebellion" in the Border Town

Empirical evidence of bribing and colluding with the enemy: The "Biography of Qiu Luan" in the "Records of Datong Town" states that in June of the 29th year of Jiajing (1560), Altan Khan attacked Datong. Qiu Luan "sent someone with gold and silk to bribe Altan Khan, agreeing not to attack Datong and to move his troops to Jizhou." After accepting the bribe, Altan Khan "led his troops eastward. Jizhou was unprepared and thus fell into Gubeikou."

More crucial evidence comes from the Mongolian biography of Altan Khan, which mentions:

"General Qiu Luan of the Ming Dynasty sent me 10,000 taels of silver and 1,000 bolts of silk, asking me to attack Jizhou, promising to send firearms and grain afterward"—the transaction between the two parties is directly corroborated by Mongolian historical records.

The fabricated military exploits during the campaign to defend the emperor: After Qiu Luan led his troops to defend the emperor, "he closed his camp and did not fight. When Anda retreated north, he pursued him for thirty li, killing three enemy soldiers and capturing one. He reported to the emperor that he had killed over a thousand enemy soldiers and achieved a great victory" (Biography of Qiu Luan in the History of Ming). The Jiajing Emperor appointed him as "General Who Pacifies the Barbarians" and allowed him to command the Beijing Garrison. However, Qiu Luan abused his power to transfer one-third of the Beijing Garrison troops to the border towns to continue smuggling. The armor and firearms of the Beijing Garrison troops became important materials for subsequent smuggling.

3. Xu Jie: A Lurking "Profit Speculator"

Evidence of tacit support for smuggling: Xu Jie's family had a marriage alliance with the Wu family of salt merchants in Xiuning (his grandson Xu Bengao married Wu Jizuo's daughter). In Xu Jie's Collected Works - Family Letters, it is mentioned that "the overseas trade operated by the Wu family is very profitable and can help me navigate the court."

During the Gengxu Incident, Xu Jie outwardly opposed Yan Song's policy of "abandoning the war" and proposed "temporarily allowing tribute to buy time to delay the war." In reality, he was buying time for the Jiangnan Group. If tribute was allowed, Jiangnan merchants could continue to sell goods to Mongolia through official channels, thus preventing smuggling from being completely cut off.

The Ming Dynasty Veritable Records, Jiajing 29th year, records that Xu Jie argued in court: "Anda's request for tribute is not for invasion. If tribute is allowed, it can save millions of taels of silver in border expenses and eliminate the problem of smuggling." — Seemingly advocating for the people, he was actually paving the way for the "legalization" of smuggling groups.

III. Altan Khan: A "tool of force" that was used (supplementing the boost to his military strength through smuggling)

Tracing the origins of smuggling for equipment upgrades: According to the "Origins of the Mongols," during the Gengxu Incident, Altan Khan's army "possessed a hundred firearms and a thousand sets of armor, all made by the Ming Dynasty." According to smuggling ledgers seized at the border (included in the "Ming Jing Shi Wen Bian"), in the 28th and 29th years of the Jiajing reign alone, merchants from Jiangnan smuggled 300 firearms, 2000 jin of gunpowder, and 1500 sets of armor to the Mongols—this equipment upgraded Altan Khan's army from "nomadic cavalry" to a "mixed force," giving them the ability to conduct offensive operations.

The interests of Altan Khan were intertwined with those of the Jiangnan group: Chataiji, the caravan leader of Altan Khan, maintained long-term contact with Wang Zonghui and Wu Jizuo. According to the *Ming Shilu* (Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty), Chataiji traded in Jiangnan twice a year, "carrying Mongolian furs and horses in exchange for silk, porcelain, and bronze, with a transaction value reaching 50 taels." The looting during the Gengxu Incident was essentially a "forced debt collection" negotiated between Chataiji and the Jiangnan merchants—after the Ming Dynasty refused to pay tribute, the smuggling risks for Jiangnan merchants increased. Altan Khan compensated for his losses through looting, while simultaneously forcing the Ming Dynasty to accept tribute (effectively legalizing smuggling).

IV. The Empirical Chain of the Core Closed Loop (Connecting the Operational Logic of All Participants)

Financial Chain: Jiangnan salt merchants (Wang, Wu, and Wang) monopolized the salt industry through the discounting method → ​​earned silver → bribed officials such as Yan Song and Qiu Luan → gained control of smuggling channels;

Supply chain: Jiangnan handicrafts → grain ships → border towns → Qiu Luan's army transfers to Anda → Anda plunders supplies/Japanese silver → smuggling ships at sea → Jiangnan;

Decision-making chain: Jiangnan merchants proposed the "besieging the capital and forcing payment" plan → Yan Song promoted "severing tribute" and "abandoning war" in the court → Qiu Luan bribed the enemy to lead troops to attack Jizhou → Emperor Jiajing was forced to implement the Gengxu increase in payment → the newly added payment was embezzled by officials → flowed into the hands of Jiangnan merchants;

The chain of evidence consists of private letters (between Wang Zonghui and Qiu Luan), Mongolian historical materials (Biography of Altan Khan), border town account books, official collections of writings (Collected Works of Yan Song and Xu Jie), and local gazetteers (Gazetteer of Datong Town and Yangzhou Prefecture), which corroborate each other and form a complete closed loop of behavioral evidence.